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STRATEGY FOR WASHINGTON LAWYERS IN CHILD
CUSTODY SUITS INVOLVING CONFLICT OF LAWS
RAY GRAVES*
Assume the following hypothetical: a decree of divorce has been
entered in Washington and custody of the children has been awarded
to W (wife). W then takes the children into State B. H (husband)
believing circumstances have changed now desires to secure a change
in the custody of the children. The question immediately arises:
Where may a suit to secure such change of custody be brought, and
where will it be more effective-in a Washington or State B court?
The choice may bear considerably on the length of time it will take,
the cost of the litigation, and the number of courts through which the
aggrieved party must go to reach the desired results. A lawyer with
this problem would necessarily direct his thoughts first to the require-
ments of jurisdiction in suits for custody, keeping in mind that various
states follow different'jurisdictional rules. These rules are:' (a) that,
domicile of the child is the sole basis of jurisdiction, (b) that physical
presence of the child in the state is necessary, (c) that physical pres-
ence of the spouses is sufficient irrespective of where the child may
be, (d) that jurisdiction, once having attached, is continuing, regard-
less of the domicile or whereabouts of the parties, and (e) .that no hard
and fast rule is to be applied, but that any of these bases might serve
depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. The last
mentioned theory presupposes that, while there may be a concurrent
jurisdiction in two or more states, a sound discretion on the part of the
courts will be exercised in disposing of the particular case.
* Member of the Washington Bar.
I See Note, 9 A.L.R. 2d 434 (1949).
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Special mention should be made of the last "rule" for it has received
closest attention and has gathered a sizable following over the past
few years.2 The writer shall advert to it occasionally for an appraisal
of whether it has provided a more satisfactory solution than prior
rules.
In recent years, an ever increasing number of cases involving some
phase of this problem has come before the appellate courts of the sev-
eral states. The purpose of this article is to review the law as it pres-
ently exists in Washington, to point out the particular problems facing
the Washington lawyer handling such a case, and to make suggestions
for effective action based upon a survey of end results accomplished
by the actual application of one or more of the bases of jurisdiction
in other states.8
Actual analysis of the law should be prefaced by the note that,
although the survey indicated that generally lawyers and courts alike
were at loss for solutions in particular cases and felt a need for revi-
sion in this field of the law,' it also revealed that, wherever practical,
suits for custody or change of custody should be brought in the state
where the child is physically present, regardless of domicile." In nearly
all cases where suit was brought in a state other than that of the child's
physical presence, where the decree was adverse to the controlling
spouse, such spouse refused to voluntarily return the child to the party
awarded custody." This fact has generally resulted in resort to the
2 See Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P. 2d 739 (1948) ; Ex parte
Kosh, 105 Cal. App. 2d 418, 233 P. 2d 598 (1951) ; Helton v. Crawley, 241 La. 296, 41
N.W. 2d 60 (1950) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Camp v. Camp, 150 Pa. Super. 649, 29 A.
2d 363 (1942) ; Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).8 Most of the cases that have arisen in the past few years with factual and legal
problems allied to those in the hypothetical case have been traced to their ultimate
disposition by correspondence with the attorneys in those cases. The correspondence
with the attorneys was had in cases where the child was outside the state of forum;
the remainder of the cases being taken directly from the reports. See an earlier article
of a general nature which incorporated the results of the survey, Graves, Strategy for
Child Custody Suits Involving Conflict of Laws, 2 DuxE B. J. 11 (1952).
4 In Daugherty v. Nelson, 234 S.W. 2d (Mo. App. 1950) the court said: "Several
theories have been developed to determine the correct basis of jurisdiction to award
custody of a minor child, as a consequence the cases dealing with the question are in
considerable confusion."
5 The exceptions to this proposition are those cases where the controlling spouse
is in the state and can be effectively controlled.
6 Little v. Little, 249 Ala. 144, 30 So. 2d 386 (1947) ; Roberts v. Roberts, 300 Ky.
454, 189 S.W. 2d 691 (1945) ; Conley v. Conley, 324 Mass. 530, 87 N.E. 2d 153 (1949) ;
Beckmann v. Beckmann, 358 Mo. 1029, 218 S.W. 2d 566 (1949) ; Hughes v. Hughes,
180 Ore. 575, 178 P. 2d 170 (1947); Commonwalth ex rel. Camp v. Camp, 150 Pa.
Super. 649, 29 A. 2d 363 (1942) (the child returned but afterward taken and not since
found) ; Clothier v. Clothier, 33 Tenn. App. 352, 232 S.W. 2d 363 (1950) ; Mills v.
Howard, 228 S.W. 2d 906 (Tex. 1950) ; Peacock v. Bradshaw, 145 Tex. 68, 194 S.W.
2d 551 (1946) ; Kern v. Linsey, 182 Va. 775, 30 S.E. 2d 707 (1944) ; Clifton v. Clifton,
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courts of a second or third state by the winning spouse,' a compromise
between the spouses,' or resort to self-help to secure the child." Often,
of course, financial considerations have prevented any further action. 0
Aside from the constitutional problem involved in assumption of
jurisdiction without the child's domcile's being in the state of the
forum, sound argument can be made for the assumption of jurisdiction
on the basis of physical presence. The court has the child before it and
can render an effective decree. Often the state in which the child is
physically present has a greater interest in the welfare of the child
and the preservation of the family unit than the state in which the
child is technically domiciled. Further, as has been indicated, the
parties most often find it necessary in the end to resort to the courts
of such state regardless of where the original action was brought. So a
direct move into those courts will often save the client money as well
as prolonged litigation. Between physical presence and domicile as a
sole criterion of choice for jurisdictional grounds (where the two do
not concur), it is thought the better argument can generally be made
in favor of physical presence. The first problem for the Washington
lawyer in each case is: What is the basis of jurisdiction for suits in-
volving custody in this state? Of course, our Supreme Court has long
held that the court making the original award of custody has "con-
tinuing jurisdiction," regardess of the whereabouts of the child. 1
Where a valid award of custody has been made in another state, how-
ever, the answer is more difficult. In re MuilinS'2 seems to say that our
courts may not reconsider such awards unless the child has become
domiciled in this state since the original award -of custody. And the
court in the Mullins case made it crystal clear that physical presence
of the child alone is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon our
courts to make a redetermination of the award. Although there was
1 D.L.R. 597 (Br. Col. 1949). In a few cases the child was returned voluntarily, but
special circumstances may account for this. Coats v. Coats, 161 Kan. 307, 167 P. 2d
290 (1946); Lotz v. Lotz, 327 Mich. 577, 42 N.W. 2d 745 (1950) (child to be re-
turned from California in July each year to Michigan-H to pay expenses for W and
child). Information has been obtained in part from attorneys in the above cases.
7 Hughes v. Hughes, supra note-6; Little v. Little, supra note 6; Boor v. Boor, 241
Iowa 973, 43 N.W. 2d 155 (1950) to cite only a few.
8 Clothier v. Clothier, supra note 6; Peacock v. Bradshaw, .upra note 6.
*Commonwealth ex rel. Camp v. Camp, supra note 6 (parties armed only with
letter from judge) ; Mills v. Howard, supra note 6; Clifton v. Clifton, supra note 6.
Io Conley v. Conley, supra note 6 (letter from attorney L. H. Miller, Brockton, Mass.
Miller, Brockton, Mass.)
11 Harris v. Harris, 71 Wash. 307, 128 Pac. 673 (1912); for a recent case see State
ex rel. Jiminez v. Superior Court, 24 Wn. 2d 194, 163 P. 2d 610 (1945), and Schaefer
v. Schaefer, 36 Wn. 2d 514, 219 P. 2d 114 (1950).
12 26 Wn. 2d 419, 174 P. 2d 790 (1946).
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some area for speculation prior to the Mullins case as to whether the
court might not, upon a proper showing of changed circumstances,
assume jurisdiction despite lack of domicile,1" the doubt seems to
have been resolved against such assumption of jurisdiction. In an
original proceeding the Washington courts might proceed where both
spouses have entered an appearance regardless of the whereabouts of
the child. 4 This would not necessarily be true upon petition for modi-
fication of a decree of a sister state.'"
The approach of the Washington Supreme Court assumes that two
or more states may have "concurrent jurisdiction," e.g., State A may
have "continuing jurisdiction" and State B jurisdiction dependent
upon domicile. In such case the Washington Supreme Court has held
(domicile being in Washington) that full faith and credit need not be
given the decree of the sister state based upon a continuing jurisdic-
tion.16 The basis of the doctrine is analogous to that found in the
divorce law, i.e., that full faith and credit must be given when the
divorce is founded upon the domicile of one of the parties, but that
the fact of domicile is open to question. It presupposes that there
is no other jurisdictional basis than domicile for making an award of
custody-a theory still open to serious question."'
The foregoing analysis of the Washington law would seem to leave
an impression of the existence of "cut and dried" rules of law, but
even with the narrower view adopted by the Washington Court there
are still serious problems. Is a decree of a sister state based upon
physical presence of the child entitled to full faith and credit where
the child is afterward removed to Washington?' 8 Is it worthwhile to
invoke the continuing jurisdiction of our courts? Where is the domicile
of the child when part time custody has been awarded to each spouse?
For a closer view of the problems, the results of the actual survey
are set out with particular attention to the result to be anticipated
when the case involves Washington law.
Is In re Mullins, supra note 12, seems to clear up any doubt remaining after Jones
v. McCloud, 19 Wn. 2d 314, 142 P. 2d 397 (1943) and State ex reL. Marthens v. Su-
perior Court, 25 Wn. 2d 125, 169 P. 2d 626 (1946).
14 State ex rel. Ranken v. Superior Court, 6 Wn. 2d 90, 106 P. 2d 1082 (1940).
15 Since child may not have been awarded to either spouse by the original decree
but to some third party and therefore possibly domiciled out of the state.
3 6I re Groves, 109 Wash. 112, 186 Pac. 300 (1919), obviously affirmed by In re
Mullins, supra note 12, since that case in the final analysis turned on the domicile of
the child.
"7 See Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
18 Under the view that only domicile confers jurisdiction the answer would seem
to be that full faith and credit need not be given.
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RESULTS WHEN COURT ACCEPTS JURISDICTION ON DOmICILIARY
GROUNDS ALTHOUGH CHILD Is OUT OF STATE
In Sampsell v. Superior Court,"9 H, W and child lEved in Los Angeles
County until 1946 when W and child went to Nevada. W obtained a
Nevada divorce and was awarded custody of the child in 1947. She
then moved to Utah and was there remarried. H in the meantime had
petitioned the Los Angeles County court for divorce and custody of
the child claiming inter alia that W had secured divorce in Nevada by
fraudulent representation of domicile there.2" The court refused to
proceed, basing its refusal on jurisdictional grounds. Upon H's peti-
tion, a mandamus was issued ordering the exercise of jurisdiction as
to the custody on the ground that physical presence of the child was
not necessary, and that, following the "concurrent jurisdiction" view,
the court might take jurisdiction on the basis of domicile. Prior to the
decision by the California Supreme Court, H filed suit in a Utah court
and was awarded custody during the summer months of each year. On
appeal the decision was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court."-
Following the view adopted by the California Supreme Court, H
might have brought suit in any of three states-California, as the
state of domicile; Nevada, which had a continuing jurisdiction (as-
suming it had original jurisdiction); and Utah because the child and
controlling spouse were physically present there. In fact, H did go
through the chain of courts in two states.22
On the surface, it appears H's lawyers would have been wise to
resort directly to the Utah courts. The question then is: What advan-
tage, if any, lies in bringing suit in either of the other two states? The
case suggests three possible answers: (1) a decree of a California or
Nevada court of recent date might have been a powerful weapon in
the hands of the plaintiff in the Utah courts; 2 (2) by this delayed
19 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P. 2d 739 (1948).
2 0 The California court determined both were domiciled in California.
21 Sampsell v. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P. 2d 550 (1949). But the court rejected the
idea that the lower court could modify the Nevada decree and preferred to rest in its
aflfirmance on "changed circumstances"-here passage of time. Proceedings on the
mandamus to the Los Angeles county court were dismissed after this decision.
22 It is suggested H would also have gone through the Nevada courts and at least
one more California court if suit had not been filed in Utah when it was, unless, upon
the first award of custody, W voluntarily returned the child to H. This is rarely the
case. The reason for the suggestion is that neither California nor Nevada would have
been able to enforce their decrees in Utah. For frank admissions that such decrees
are unenforceable, see: Weber v. Weber, 10 Alaska 214 (1942) and Peacock v. Brad-
shaw, .supra note 6.
23 Since full faith and credit may be given. If the decree is not of recent date there
will have been time for changed circumstances to have taken place. In Moloney v.
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action in arriving at the court of final disposition H has secured a
passage of time which may supply the needed "change of circum-
stances," and (3) a suit in the California court might be more conve-
nient from both a working and financial standpoint, for as between
the home court and a foreign court, the former is more likely to favor
the plaintiff.2' Then too, occasionally, the defendant returns the child
voluntarily.
While the plaintiff in the Sampsell case succeeded in securing a
change in a previous award of custody, would the same strategy be
desirable in a case where a decree of custody is sought for the first
time? In this respect consider Beckmann v. Beckmann." In that case H
suddenly and unexpectedly departed Missouri, the state of domicile,
taking the children with him and settling in California. W sued for
divorce and custody in Missouri. H appeared only specially to contest
the jurisdiction. The court awarded custody to W, and the decree was
affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court. Nevertheless, W did not get
the children for H refused to send them back. W has not pursued her
remedies in California. The final result suggests that W has gained
little by the Missouri decree and its affirmance; further prosecution is
necessary for effective results. Perhaps the more effective way would
have been for W to bring habeas corpus in California immediately
following the Missouri lower court's decree,2" if not direct resort to
the California courts in the first instance. If the direct method had
been used and suit brought before H had a chance to settle down, such
suit might have resulted in a decree for the plaintiff because of the
circumstances under which the children were taken." Possibly then,
while in the Sampsell type case (where one party has already been
awarded custody) resort to the state of domicile may sometimes be
desirable, it may be disastrous in such cases as Beckmann for financial
or other reasons. The recommended strategy would seem to be to
prosecute in the courts of the child's "presence" state immediately
following the first award of custody in the home state. This is espe-
cially true since, when the plaintiff wins a later action in his home
Moloney, 167 Kan. 444, 206 P. 2d 1076 (1949) twenty-four days was sufficient time
for changed circumstances.
24 That this is often the case, see: Ex parte Brown, 90 Cal. App. 2d 651, 203 P. 2d
799 (1949) where the parties brought suits in different states at approximately the same
time and both received awards of custody.
25 358 Mo. 1029, 218 S.W. 2d 566 (1949).
28 This was the method used in Hughes v. Hughes, supra note 6, and Little v. Little,
supra note 6.
2T Crocker v. Crocker, 122 Colo. 49, 219 P. 2d 311 (1950). But cf. Helton v.
Crawley, 241 Iowa 290, 41 N.W. 2d 60 (1950).
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court, the defendant will generally appeal on grounds of jurisdiction
to secure a passage of time and give the child a chance to become
familiar with his new surroundings in order that when the plaintiff
finally reaches the state where the child is, the defendant can plead
"changed circumstances." The method suggested may prevent defend-
ant's strategy from being effective.
When a superior court in Washington assumes jurisdiction upon
the basis of domicile and the child is not within the state, there is no
reason to expect any better results than have been attained elsewhere.
The problem" presented is simply to determine the basis of jurisdiction
in the asylum state. If that state accepts no other basis than domicile
for jurisdiction one should secure the modification in Washington and
bring habeas corpus in the asylum state. The same remedy is recom-
mended in like situations where the Washington court has already
made an award of custody and the child has not yet had time to become
domiciled in the other state. If the asylum state accepts physical pres-
ence of the child as a jurisdictional ground then, as already suggested,
the more feasible plan is to secure the change of custody there.
To illustrate the results to be expected where the asylum state
accepts no other jurisdictional basis than domicile (as in Washing-
ton), see Allman v. Register;2' H and W were divorced in Henrico
County, Virginia, in 1947, and the court then awarded custody of the
child to W during the school year and to H during the summer months.
After the summer of 1950 the father, living in North Carolina, refused
to return the child to Virginia and W brought habeas corpus in Meck-
lenburg County, North Carolina. That court granted a change of cus-
tody in H's favor. On appeal, the decision was reversed by the Supreme
Court because, it was said, the lower court was without jurisdiction
since the child was not domiciled in North Carolina. On remand, the
county court, in accordance with the opinion of the Supreme Court,
ordered the child returned to its mother in Virginia. Had the same pro-
ceedings been brought in Washington under the same circumstances,
an identical result would have been reached under the law of the
Mulins case, which involves a nearly identical situation.
RESULTS WHEN SUIT Is BROUGHT IN STATE WHERE ONE OR BOTH
SPOUSES ARE PRESENT AND CHILD Is ABSENT
In this type of case, if the court has the controlling spouse before it,
measures can be taken to insure return of the child if the decree is
28233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E. 2d 861 (1951).
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adverse to such party. Such measures may include sequestration of
the defendant's property in the state,29 modification of former alimony
decrees,"0 and requiring the defendant to post a bond to insure return
of the child.'
If the court in which such action is brought requires physical pres-
ence of the child and accepts no other basis, it would seem it would
not take such a case. On the other hand, if the child is domiciled in
the state, those courts basing jurisdiction on either domicile, physical
presence of the spouses, or the view of "concurrent jurisdiction" would
seem to encounter no difficulties. Such would be the case if the pro-
ceeding were in Washington.2
Often the court has little knowledge of or interest in the child and
frankly admits this, but, without too much hesitation, proceeds to
award custody. This occurs where the parties go to another state for
a divorce and leave the child behind with relatives or friends. But in
many cases, for example where either or both spouses have thought it
desirable to take the child out of the state until the marital trouble
was over, or solely to escape the effect of a decree which will probably
be against the spouse in question,34 the court does have such knowl-
edge and interest. Here the court is generally in an advantageous posi-
tion to force the party to bring the child within the state and when it
has taken such action it has been effective.
In the latter type case it would seem the state's interest in the
child's welfare is such that the court should make the custody award.
This would not be true where it is the spouses who go out of the state
rather than the child.
RESULTS WHEN CHILD AND ONE OR BOTH SPOUSES ARE OUT OF
STATE BUT COURT CONSIDERS ITSELF TO HAVE "CONTINUING
JURISDICTION"
It goes without saying, the problem here is to a large extent like
that of taking original jurisdiction because of domicile where the child
20 Turney v. Nooney, 9 N.J. Super. 333, 74 A. 2d 356 (1950). See also: Common-
wealth ex rel. v. Rahal, 48 Pa. D.&C. 568 (1942) (attachment threatened).
30 Levell v. Levell, 183 Ore. 39, 190 P. 2d 527 (1948). See also Coats v. Coats, 161
Kan. 307, 167 P. 2d 290 (1946).
31 Ex parte Halvey, 185 Misc. 52, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 761 (1945) affd 269 App. Div.
1019, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 396 (1945) aff'd sub nom People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 295
N.Y. 836, 66 N.E. 2d 851 (1946), aff'd o other grounds 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
32 State ex rel. Ranken v. Superior Court, 6 Wn. 2d 90, 106 P. 2d 1082 (1940).
33 Wilson v. Wilson, 66 Nev. 405, 212 P. 2d 1066 (1949). New York refused to give
effect to such custody award of a Cuban court. Quintana v. Quintana, 101 N.Y.S. 2d
593 (1950).
34 See: Commonwealth ex rel. v. Rahal, supra note 28, and Fagan v. Fagan, 131
Conn. 688, 42 A. 2d 41 (1945).
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and one of the spouses are out of the state. Washington courts have
often assumed jurisdiction on the basis that they made the original
award, and have been upheld. 5 However, such tactics are likely to
prove fruitless.
An Oregon case worthy of examination as indicating likely results
is Hughes v. Hughes."0 In that case H and W were divorced by decree
of the Multnomah County Court in 1938, and W was awarded custody
of the child. H, feeling circumstances had later changed, desired to
secure custody of the child during the summer months. H was then
domiciled in Washington and W in California. The problem would be
where to file such a petition. The temptation would be to say Cali-
fornia, and, under the "concurrent jurisdiction" view, either California
or Oregon would be prope forums. In the actual case, modification of
the decree was sought in the court making the original award and that
court granted H part-time custody. Defendant appealed, and prior. to
the final decision by the Oregon Supreme Court, plaintiff filed suit in
California in the county where the child was. That court adopted the
decree of the Oregon court as modified and afterward affirmed. The'
case suggests that whether one goes to the courts having continuing
jurisdiction or not, he will finally end up in the courts of the state
where the child is. Even here, the defendant by fleeing to a third state
which might also consider itself to have jurisdiction; may finally win,
and often has37-the inevitable result of allowing the child's presence
to confer jurisdiction.
Occasionally though, the court exercising continuing jurisdiction has
means to effectively control the absent spouse and child. Such a case
is Oregon's Levell v. Levell3s where the court had originally made. an
award of alimony and custody to the wife and threatened to cut off
such alimony unless she heeded the court's orders.
When the spouse granted custody has changed domicile, the new
domiciliary state will sometimes deny the jurisdiction of the court
claiming continuing jurisdiction and refuse to give extraterritorial
effect to any modification by that court." Only those states recognizing
35 State ex rel. Jiminez v. Superior Court, 24 Wn. 2d 194, 163 P. 2d 610 (1945);
Schaefer v. Schaefer, 36 Wn. 2d 514, 219 P. 2d 114 (1950) and Tee Wheeler v.
Wheeler, 37 Wn. 2d 159, 222 P. 2d 400 (1950).
36 180 Ore. 575, 178 P. 2d 170 (1947).
37 Little v. Little, 249 Ala. 144, 30 So. 2d 386 (1947) with the final chapter written
in Little v. Franklin, 40 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1949) (letter from Chason & Stone, Bay
Minette, Ala.); Boor v. Boor, 241 Iowa 973, 43 N.W. 2d 155 (1950).
88 Supra, note 30.
39 McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P. 2d 444 (1945) and Moss v. Ingram,
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only domicile or physical presence of the child as the sole jurisdic-
tional basis would be in such category. This is the position of the
Washington courts,'" even though inconsistently they claim to exercise
such continuing jurisdiction. Those states taking the "concurrent juris-
diction" view would not be.
Here again, attention should be drawn to the fact that by going to
the state having continuing jurisdiction, the plaintiff in the Hughes
case secured himself a powerful weapon. Theoretically, the decree in
both Oregon and California would have been the same, i.e., based on
what the child's welfare demanded. Actually the reverse is often true
and the plaintiff will get a more favorable reception outside the defend-
ant's home state.
The court has a more difficult task when the plaintiff has secured
his "weapon" in the form of a modification by a court of a foreign
country. An Ohio court," while recognizing that the foreign (Belgian)
court acted on the basis of continuing jurisdiction, nevertheless re-
fused to give its decree effect, because if service of process in the modi-
fication proceedings had been made in Ohio it would have been invalid
and have conferred no jurisdiction. It is doubtful if this rationale
would stand close analysis for the Belgian court already had continu-
ing jurisdiction, needing no acquisition by service of process. This
seems to be the first time the courts have been troubled with such a
problem except in Washington."
RESULTS WHEN CHILD IS PRESENT BUT NOT DOMICILED
IN FORUM STATE
It has already been noted that the prospects of the Washington
courts' assuming jurisdiction on the basis of physical presence are
slight. However, many states, perhaps the numerical majority, will
accept physical presence of the child as adequate grounds for jurisdic-
tion. A few regard this as the sole basis." Thus, when one spouse has
fled with a child from Washington and taken asylum in such a state
the problem is before the Washington lawyer. Many of the results to
246 Ala. 214, 20 So. 2d 202 (1944) (ignoring a decree of the Mississippi court made
while the child was there).
40 In re Groves, 109 Wash. 112, 186 Pac. 300 (1919).
41 In re Vanderborght, 91 N.E. 2d 47 (Cuyahoga Com. PI., Ohio, 1950).
42 In re Groves, supra note 40, denying validity of substituted service in such a case.
438 See for example Boor v. Boor, 241 Iowa 973, 43 N.W. 2d 155 (1950) (defendant
fled two or three days before institution of proceedings in Indiana. The Iowa court said
the Indiana court was without jurisdiction to award custody to the plaintiff bcause the
child was in Iowa at the time of judgment.)
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be expected here have already been indicated, and as suggested earlier,
whenever practical, suit should be brought in the state where the child
is physically present. However, careful planning on the part of the
attorney is necessary. He should learAl the jurisdictional ground in the
domiciliary state, and in the state where the child is, what weight the
latter state will give to the decrees of his client's state, and how prone
the courts of the second state are to find "changed circumstances."
In those states which accept physical presence of the child as suffi-
cient grounds for assuming jurisdiction, the usual holding is that full
faith and credit will be given to the decrees of other states," and that
as to facts occurring before the date of the foreign decree, they are
res judicata.? There appears to be a wide split on the last question,
some courts holding that such decrees are only res judicata as to facts
actually before the court at the time of judgment." It would seem if
the foreign court so considers its own decrees, then a like consideration
would prevail as to the decrees of the sister state.' As to facts subse-
quent to the foreign decree, a determination on the merits is made, and
if "changed circumstances" indicate its desirability, the court will
change the custody. In other words, the mere fact of "concurrent
jurisdiction" does not generally mean a redetermination of all the
facts.
More complications enter the picture where both spouses file suits
in different states at approximately the same time and the courts
award custody to opposite parties. In one such case the California
Supreme Court held"8 that the decree of the other state (Nevada)
would govern because it was made several days earlier. Furthermore,
when Nevada handed down its decree the parties were then divorced
and the later California decree of divorce was inoperative, and since
the custody award was merely incidental thereto and did not purport
44 See: Scott v. Scott, 227 Ind. 396, 86 N.E. 2d 533 (1949) ; STUIOERG, CONFLICr
OF LAWS 327 (2d ed. 1951).
45 McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P. 2d 444 (1945); Lofts v. Lofts,
222 S.W. 2d 101 (Mo. App. 1949). 3
4e Ferguson v. Ferguson, 251 Ala. 645, 38 So. 2d 853 (1949). The court there said:
"Such changed conditions to which the authorities refer is not necessarily confined to
subsequent events but may include matter that was discovered though not disclosed
when the original decree was entered." Accord; Ex parte State ex rel. McLaughlin,
250 Ala. 579, 25 So. 2d 507 (1948). But cf. Dotsch v. Grimes, 75 Cal. App. 2d 418, 171
P. 2d 506 (1946) (holding that a showing of changed circumstances was not necessary
since the welfare of the child was paramount) and Application of Reed, 152 Nebr. 819,
43 N.W. 2d 161 (1950) to same effect.
47 See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944) and Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610
(1947).
4SIn re Brown, 90 Cal. App. 2d 651, 203 P. 2d 799 (1949).
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to be a modification of the earlier Nevada decree, it would also be
ineffective. If those were the real reasons, the moral for the attorney
might be to file his petition in the court having the shortest docket.
Actually, the court was probably adhering to that salutary policy of
using the judicial discretion which is part and parcel of the "concur-
rent jurisdiction" theory adopted in the Sampsell case.
If there are no prior decrees before the court, and the child is pres-
ent in the state, little trouble is to be anticipated, unless, as in Wash-
ington, the state is one which recognizes no ground of jurisdiction
other than domicile.
PROBLEMS OF "DOUBLE" AND "SHIFTING" DOMICILE
Decrees containing part-time custody awards to each of the spouses
often give rise to later controversies over the child's domicile. Wash-
ington decisions in this area have indicated that the proper preventive
may well be to secure a decree providing the basic custody to be in
one of the spouses," or making the child a ward of the court."0 Even
then there is no assurance of the desired result since the spouse with
temporary control may seek asylum in a state not requiring domicile
for jurisdiction. Suppose that H, domiciled in Texas, has been awarded
custody of the child for three months, and W, domiciled in Oklahoma,
has been awarded custody for the other nine months of each year.
Does the child's domicile shift back and forth as the change of cus-
tody takes place, i.e., does the child have a "double domicile"? If so,
does the domicile change when the child is or should have been trans-
ferred? The latter is the holding of some courts."' In consequence,
when the child is with H in Texas, H can seek a change of custody
even though Texas requires domicile for jurisdiction. And if H holds
the child longer than the three month period, W can bring suit in
Oklahoma, despite that state's requirement of domicile, since the child
now should be in Oklahoma. Though this rule is of no importance in a
case where the two states will accept jurisdiction on the basis of the
child's physical presence, it definitely provides a method of securing a
change of custody in the most favorable court where both states re-
quire or accept domicile as a basis. But rather than holding the child
beyond the custody period and seeking the change when the other
49 See Wheeler v. Wheeler, 37 Wn. 2d 159, 222 P. 2d 400 (1950).
50 Martin v. Martin, 27 Wn. 2d 308, 178 P. 2d 284 (1947).
51 Mills v. Howard, 228 S.W. 2d 906 (Tex. 1950); Ex parte Miller, 301 Okla.
499, 207 P. 2d 290 (1949).
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parent brings habeas corpus, the petition must be brought within the
custody period, else domicile has again shifted.
Still another situation arises where H and W are" domiciled in differ-
ent states and the controlling spouse dies. Suppose for example W,
who has been awarded custody of the child, is now domiciled in New
Mexico where she lives with her parents, and H is still domiciled in
Texas, the state where the original award was made. If W dies, where
is the child domiciled? The answer given by one court is that, upon the
death of W, the child's domicile would automatically shift back to the
state of the father's domicile.5"
In both types of cases one of the two states will generally have a
continuing jurisdiction and often would not need to depend upon
domicile. Yet there is a noticeable lack of discussion of. continuing
jurisdiction in the cases-probably because the lawyers have not
pushed the point.
It might be noted here that the whole jurisdictional problem is not
peculiar to the United States, and the Canadians at least have fared
little better.58
CoNcLusIoN
Analyses of the jurisdictional bases and recommendations for
remedial action in this field of the law are well-covered eleswhere.54
Suffice it to say here that there is a tremendous need for uniformity
in this area of the law-a need which has not been helped by the recent
adoption of the "concurrent jurisdiction' theory in a -number of states.
The problem considered here is one of strategy and no definite set
of rules can be supplied because of the lack of uniformity among the
states. Effective results in each case will be dependent upon a sound
knowledge of the jurisdictional rules of the states involved.
52 Peacock v. Bradshaw, 145 Tex. 68, 194 S.W. 2d 551 (1946) ; Note, 136 A.L.R.
914 (1942).
53 Clifton v. Clifton [1949] 1 D.L.R. 597 (the court awarded H custody of the
child who was domiciled in British Columbia but livin-in Alberta with its mother. H
secured the child by self-help after W refused to return him voluntarily.) But cf.
Cleaver v. Cleaver [1949] 4 D.L.R. 367, where the Ontario court refused to take
jurisdiction where the child was out of the province. McKee v. McKee [1951] 1 All.
Eng. Rep. 942, is the most recent authority for the Canadians.
54 Stansbury, Cu.tody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAW &
CONTEMP: PROa. 819 (1944); Graves, Strategy for Child Custody Suits Involving
Conflict of Laws, 2 DuxE B.J. 11 (1952).
